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Abstract 
 South Africa has developed domestic legislation governing all 
surrogacy matters within the country. These provisions are 
contained in Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
In Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood 
Agreement 2014 2 All SA 312 (GNP), the commissioning parents 
did not adhere to the requirement provided by Chapter 19. The 
parties to the (initially informal) surrogacy agreement authorised 
the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother prior to the 
confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement by the 
court. In considering the best interest of the resultant child, the 
High Court decided to ratify the inadequate surrogate 
motherhood agreement. 
This discussion aims to establish whether the court's judgement 
in Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood 
Agreement was in accordance with the provisions of current 
legislation and case law. It furthermore aims to answer two 
primary questions: firstly, whether adjudicators should make use 
of the best interest of the child when ratifying inadequate 
surrogate motherhood agreements; and secondly, in what 
manner the court should go about implementing the best interest 
of the child when validating inadequate surrogate motherhood 
agreements. 
It is submitted that courts should refrain from applying the best 
interest of the child as a constitutional right in inadequate 
surrogacy matters where the child is yet to be born alive, in 
accordance with the Digesta Texts. Parties to the invalid 
agreement should rather be instructed to make use of a section 
22 parental responsibilities and rights agreement, a section 28 
termination agreement, or adoption as provided for by chapter 
15 of the Children's Act. 
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1  Introduction 
The provisions contained in chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (the 
Children's Act)1 address the elements pertinent to formal surrogate 
motherhood agreements.2 Parties who wish to exercise their reproductive 
rights by making use of surrogacy are required to enter into a written 
agreement that results in the complete transfer of parental responsibilities 
and rights from the surrogate mother to the commissioning parents once the 
child is born.3 Contracting parties are furthermore instructed to approach 
the High Court for the confirmation of a surrogacy agreement before the 
artificial insemination of the surrogate mother is allowed to take place.4 
Concern arises, however, when commissioning parents do not adhere to 
the requirements prescribed in chapter 19. This occurred in Ex parte MS; In 
re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 2014 2 All SA 312 
(GNP) (Ex parte MS). Notwithstanding the non-compliance, the court, 
having considered the best interest of the as yet unborn child, ratified the 
surrogacy agreement ex post facto.5 
The High Court's decision in Ex parte MS has been criticised for having set 
a precedent that could allow for future misuse of the principle of the best 
                                            
  Mathabo Baase. BA (Law and Psychology) LLB LLM (Comparative Child Law, 
NWU). Lecturer in South African Private Law: System and Context, University of 
Cape Town, South Africa. E-mail: Mathabo.baase@uct.ac.za. The research for this 
contribution was completed during the author's appointment as lecturer at the North-
West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. A special word of gratitude is 
accordingly extended to the North-West University and their Faculty of Law for their 
resources and support. Particular emphasis is placed on the contributions of Prof R 
Robinson, Prof M Carnelley, Prof H Lubbe and Ms C Feldhaus. 
1  Kindly note that any and all further use of "chapter 19" will be in relation to chapter 
19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (hereafter the Children's Act). 
2 Informal surrogacy occurs when private agreements are made between family 
members or people who know each other. Ex parte Application WH 2011 4 SA 630 
(GNP) para 2. Formal surrogacy, on the other hand, occurs when parties enter into 
a surrogacy agreement in terms of chapter 19 of the Children's Act. 
3 Sections 292 and 297(1) of the Children's Act. Parental responsibilities and rights 
refer to those provided by s 18 of the Children's Act. A surrogate mother is the 
woman who carries the child to term and gives birth to the child (s 297 of the 
Children's Act). While the commissioning parent is the individual who makes use of 
surrogacy as a way of exercising her reproductive right, given their medically 
permanent and irreversible inability to carry a child to term (s 295 of the Children's 
Act). The term "born" refers to children who are born alive in terms of the 
requirements provided by the Digesta Texts. 
4  Section 296(1)(a) of the Children's Act. 
5  Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 2014 2 SA 
312 (GNP) (hereafter Ex parte MS) para 9. A brief exposition regarding the nature 
of the parties' non-compliance is conducted in part 2 of this contribution. 
M BAASE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  3 
interest of the child.6 Commissioning parents who circumvent the protocol 
provided in chapter 19 would be able to do so in matters where it could be 
demonstrated that it serves the best interest of the child. Such 
circumvention would, however, render relevant provisions in chapter 19 
moot. This possibility alludes to a need to reconsider the manner in which 
the High Court implements the principle of the best interest of the child when 
ratifying inadequate surrogacy agreements.7 
This article reflects on the manner in which the best interest of the child is 
interpreted and applied in inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements.8 
The court's decision-making process in Ex parte MS will be analysed as a 
point of departure. Then a brief comparative discussion of the current 
practice of formal surrogacy in the United Kingdom will be conducted. Not 
only has the United Kingdom been regulating surrogacy since 1985, but it 
has also recorded an estimated number of 149 children born to surrogates 
per year.9 Legislation in the United Kingdom furthermore provides for the ex 
post facto adoption of children born from surrogate motherhood agreements 
by means of a parental order similar to the agreement provided in section 
22 of the Children's Act. This contribution will illustrate how and why 
sections 22, 28 and chapter 15 of the Children's Act can serve as viable 
alternatives for commissioning parents who did not meet the requirements 
provided in chapter 19. 
2 Ex parte MS. In re: Confirmation of Surrogate 
Motherhood Agreement 2014 2 All SA 312 (GNP) 
2.1 Introduction 
In Ex parte MS the High Court was approached by three applicants. The 
first and second applicants were the commissioning parents and the third 
the surrogate mother.10 The ex parte application brought before Keightley J 
                                            
6  Louw 2014 De Jure 116. 
7 An agreement where the parties did not adhere to all the requirements provided in 
chapter 19 of the Children's Act. Kindly note that the legislative guidance regarding 
the court's use of the principle of the best interest of the child (ie whether or not the 
principle is of paramount or primary consideration) will be discussed in part 3.1 of 
this contribution. 
8  The term "inadequate" throughout this discussion refers to the commissioning 
parents' administrative and material non-compliance with chapter 19 of the 
Children's Act in surrogacy matters.  
9 Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_ 
REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20
surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 19, 38. 
10  Ex parte MS para 1. The legal provisions according to which the application was 
brought before the court, being s 292 read together with s 295 of the Children's Act. 
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for the confirmation of a surrogate motherhood agreement in accordance 
with section 292(1)(e) of the Children's Act was heard in chambers.11 
Two legal questions arose in Ex parte MS. The first pertained to the 
competency and discretion of the court to confirm surrogate motherhood 
agreements that do not meet the requirements contained in chapter 19.12 
The second pertained to the proper interpretation of chapter 19 and the 
protocol that should be followed in future cases that present similar facts.13 
The court essentially aimed to clarify what the requirements were for parties 
who entered into oral surrogate motherhood agreements with the further 
intent to approach the High Court for the confirmation of those 
agreements.14 
Having received the requested written submissions from Ms Retief, the 
applicants' counsel, and after hearing the oral submissions, Keightley J 
granted an order on 1 November 2013 which resulted in the confirmation of 
the surrogate motherhood agreement entered into by the applicants after 
the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother had taken place.15 
In order to understand fully the adjudication process of the High Court it is 
necessary to analytically consider the facts in Ex parte MS. 
2.2 Facts of the case 
The commissioning parents in Ex parte MS were both South African 
citizens, residing in Gauteng, and married in 1991.16 Attempts to conceive 
a child of their own were unsuccessful due to the commissioning mother's 
chronic medical diagnosis.17 Upon receiving this diagnosis the 
commissioning parents sought the advice of numerous fertility specialists 
and underwent medical treatment and procedures, including in vitro 
fertilisation.18 After two miscarriages the commissioning parents were 
                                            
11  Ex parte MS para 2. 
12  Ex parte MS para 10.1. 
13  Ex parte MS para 10.2. 
14  Ex parte MS para 10.2. 
15  Ex parte MS para 2. Kindly note that by confirming the surrogate motherhood 
agreement the court also nullified the parties' violation of ss 303 and 305 of the 
Children's Act. Therefore, none of the individuals who were party to the unlawful 
artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother were held accountable. 
16  Ex parte MS para 11. 
17  Ex parte MS para 11. 
18  Ex parte MS para 11. 
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informed by medical experts that they could realise their desire to have a 
child of their own only by making use of an egg donor and a surrogate.19 
In 2010 the commissioning parents entered into their first surrogate 
motherhood agreement, which was confirmed by the court on 8 September 
2010. The surrogate mother decided, however, not to honour the 
agreement, which resulted in the abandonment of the fertilisation process.20 
The commissioning parents subsequently entered into a second surrogate 
motherhood agreement with a different surrogate.21 The court confirmed 
this second surrogate motherhood agreement on 8 June 2011 and the 
surrogate mother attempted artificial fertilisation twice to no avail.22 
Having endured both emotional and financial loss the commissioning 
parents hesitated about entering into a third surrogate motherhood 
agreement.23 They decided to go ahead, however, after they had been 
approached by a surrogate who was well acquainted with the second 
surrogate mother and familiar with the earlier difficulties.24 Given their past 
disappointments, the commissioning parents decided to refrain from 
contacting their attorney until they were certain of the surrogate mother's 
commitment and successful pregnancy.25 The parties thereafter entered 
into a verbal surrogate motherhood agreement during September 2012 and 
sought the assistance of their attorney only after the successful artificial 
insemination and stabilisation of the surrogate.26 Upon critically analysing 
the facts that were placed before the court, it can be argued that the parties' 
non-compliance was both administrative and material in nature. Regarding 
the former (administrative) non-compliance, the parties failed to adhere to 
the provisions in chapter 19 that regulate the confirmation of surrogate 
motherhood agreements.27 Their non-compliance was also material in 
nature because it resulted in the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate 
mother.28 
                                            
19  Ex parte MS para 12. 
20  Ex parte MS para 13. 
21  Ex parte MS para 13. 
22  Ex parte MS para 13. 
23  Ex parte MS para 14. 
24  Ex parte MS para 14. 
25  Ex parte MS para 15. 
26  Ex parte MS para 15. 
27  Section 296(1)(a) of the Children's Act. 
28  Section 303 of the Children's Act. The reader is reminded of the fact that the parties 
had followed the correct protocol during their first two attempts at concluding a valid 
surrogate motherhood agreement. This argument will be extrapolated in part 2.4 of 
this contribution. 
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According to the High Court the commissioning parents were not legal 
experts and, being lay people, did not fully appreciate or anticipate the 
consequences of their actions.29 This justified their commencement with the 
artificial fertilisation of the surrogate prior to the legal confirmation of the 
surrogate motherhood agreement by the High Court.30 The parties obtained 
legal advice upon discovering that their failure to adhere to the requirements 
set out in chapter 19 would influence the status of the unborn child and, 
furthermore, burden the surrogate mother with the obligation of supporting 
her resultant child.31 They therefor applied for the confirmation of their 
surrogate motherhood agreement in order to rectify their respective legal 
positions. At this point the surrogate mother was already 33 weeks 
pregnant.32 She confirmed to the court that she had entered into the 
agreement with the commissioning parents for altruistic reasons and had no 
intention of keeping the child she was carrying on behalf of the 
commissioning parents as she had four children of her own.33 
During its decision-making process the High Court made specific reference 
to relevant sections in chapter 19.34 
2.3 Ratio decidendi 
The High Court correctly identified the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate 
mother prior to the confirmation of a surrogate motherhood agreement as 
unlawful in accordance with section 296(1)(a) of the Children's Act.35 It 
made reference to the common law principle which holds that any 
agreement to commit an unlawful act be deemed unenforceable.36 This 
includes acts that are "unlawful in terms of a statute".37 According to the 
High Court any indirect or direct act that contributes to or encourages 
another to commit an unlawful act may also be regarded as being 
unenforceable, depending on the existence of a sufficiently close 
connection.38 
                                            
29  Ex parte MS para 16. 
30  Ex parte MS para 16. 
31  Ex parte MS para 16. 
32  Ex parte MS para 16. 
33  Ex parte MS para 16. 
34  Ex parte MS paras 19-23. 
35  Ex parte MS para 32. See furthermore ss 303(1), 305(1), 305(1)(b), 305(6) and 
305(7) of the Children's Act. 
36  Ex parte MS para 31. 
37  Ex parte MS para 31. 
38  Ex parte MS para 31. 
M BAASE  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  7 
The court maintained, however, that the common law principle need not be 
applied in a determinative manner with regard to the issues arising in Ex 
parte MS.39 In this instance the court referred to Ex parte WH,40 where the 
adjudicator emphasised the unique nature of surrogate motherhood 
agreements and their ultimate purpose to secure the best interests of the 
child to be born.41 Keightley J also emphasised that the framework of a 
surrogate motherhood agreement is multifaceted and inter-relational.42 
Thus it requires careful consideration and weighing up of the rights and 
interests of all the parties involved. 
In addition, the High Court made reference to the provisions contained in 
section 39(2) of the Constitution.43 This provision encourages courts to 
adopt the most reasonably plausible interpretation.44 In attempting to reach 
a reasonably plausible interpretation that still complies with the Constitution, 
a court must read legislation in a purposeful and contextual manner.45 Such 
a reading may necessitate a more generous statutory interpretation in some 
instances.46 
Keightley J furthermore maintained that the provisions contained in chapter 
19 of the Children's Act do not explicitly make provision for instances where 
the commissioning parents enter into a verbal surrogate motherhood 
agreement which results in the artificial fertilisation and eventual pregnancy 
of the surrogate mother before approaching the court for the confirmation of 
a legally concluded (written and signed) surrogate motherhood 
agreement.47 
The court in Ex parte MS made its three-pronged argument regarding the 
interpretation and application of chapter 19 in relation to its competency to 
confirm inadequate surrogacy agreements against this backdrop. 
The first argument made by the court is based on the ambiguity of chapter 
19 with respect to the authority attributed to the High Court when confirming 
                                            
39  Ex parte MS para 34. 
40  Ex parte Application WH 2011 4 SA 630 (GNP). 
41  Ex parte MS para 34. 
42  Ex parte MS para 7. 
43  Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution) places an obligation on courts to interpret legislation in a manner that 
would promote the object, spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights. 
44  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 61. 
45  Ex parte MS para 36. 
46  Ex parte MS para 36. 
47  Ex parte MS paras 4 and 5. 
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a surrogate motherhood agreement.48 It emphasised what it considered to 
be contradictory wording between the provisions made in section 295(b)(ii) 
and section 295(d) and (e) of chapter 19.49 The wording in section 295(b)(ii) 
requires the court to be satisfied that the commissioning parents are on all 
counts suitable to accept "the parenthood of the child that is to be 
conceived".50 At the same time section 295(d) and (e) requires the court to 
be satisfied that due provision has been made towards the future care, 
welfare, interests and upbringing of the child to be born.51 
The court therefore maintained that the category provided in section 295(d) 
and (e) seems broad enough to encompass not only a child not yet 
conceived but also an unborn child who had already been conceived but 
was yet to be born at the time when confirmation of the surrogate 
motherhood agreement was sought.52 The court therefore considered the 
provisions contained in section 295 to include matters where the child was 
yet to be conceived when the surrogate motherhood agreement was 
presented to the court for confirmation as well as those where the child had 
already been conceived but was yet to be born.53 
In addition the court maintained that sections 292 and 295 do not require 
the High Court to be satisfied that the surrogate mother has not been 
artificially fertilised and is accordingly not pregnant at the time the court is 
approached for the confirmation of a surrogate motherhood agreement.54 It 
was therefore held by the court that these provisions did not preclude it from 
confirming verbal surrogate motherhood agreements after the surrogate 
had been artificially fertilised.55 
Finally, when considering the prohibitive legislation, the High Court held that 
the legislation primarily prohibited artificial fertilisation of the surrogate 
mother prior to the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement.56 
It also maintained, however, that sections 296 and 303 do not prohibit 
commissioning parents from formally concluding a surrogacy agreement 
and approaching the High Court for confirmation after artificial fertilisation of 
the surrogate mother has occurred.57 The court averred that the Legislature 
                                            
48  Ex parte MS para 40. 
49  Ex parte MS para 40. 
50  Ex parte MS para 40. 
51  Ex parte MS para 40. 
52  Ex parte MS para 40. 
53  Ex parte MS para 41. 
54  Ex parte MS para 42. 
55  Ex parte MS para 43. 
56  Ex parte MS para 45. 
57  Ex parte MS para 46. 
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would have expressly provided this additional limitation if this had been its 
intention.58 
With regard to section 297(2) the court argued that a surrogate motherhood 
agreement will be deemed to be invalid only if it does not comply with the 
requirements provided in sections 292 and 295.59 Since neither of these 
sections expressly prohibits commissioning parents from approaching the 
High Court ex post facto, the other requirements provided in these sections 
would be adhered to upon the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood 
agreement by the court, and this adherence and confirmation would in turn 
render the surrogate motherhood agreement valid:60 
As far as section 297(2) is concerned, this provision states that a surrogacy 
agreement that does not comply with the provisions of the Act is invalid. The 
Act spells out very clearly what is required for purposes of a valid surrogacy 
agreement, viz compliance with the requirements of section 292, and 
confirmation of the agreement by a court if it is satisfied that the requirements 
of section 295 have been met. If a surrogacy agreement meets these 
requirements, and is confirmed by the court, it will be valid.61 
In its conclusion, the High Court emphasised the fact that although chapter 
19 expressly prohibits the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother prior 
to the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement, this does not 
impinge on the validity of surrogate motherhood agreements, nor does it 
prohibit the High Court from confirming such an agreement ex post facto.62 
The court substantiated its interpretation of chapter 19 by maintaining that 
the parties' constitutional rights would be undermined if the legislation were 
interpreted in a prohibitive manner.63 With regard to the commissioning 
parents, these rights would include the right to dignity, as they would be 
deprived of the opportunity to experience a fully subjective family life, as 
well as the right to make reproductive choices.64 The surrogate mother 
would be imposed with full parental responsibilities and rights, which would 
subsequently infringe upon her right to make her own reproductive 
choices.65 With regard to the unborn, the court maintained the following: 
                                            
58  Ex parte MS para 46. 
59  Ex parte MS para 47. 
60  Ex parte MS para 47. 
61  Ex parte MS para 47. 
62  Ex parte MS para 48. 
63  Ex parte MS para 50. 
64  Ex parte MS para 51. Here the court maintains that adoption would be the only 
alternative available to the commissioning parents. 
65  Ex parte MS para 52. 
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Above all else, it is the rights and interest of the 'sleeping partner' in the 
surrogacy relationship, i.e. the unborn child, that demand the most protection. 
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution guarantees to every child the right to 
family or parental care. In addition, section 28(2) specifies that: 'A child's best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.'66 
The High Court emphasised the detrimental effect that the non-confirmation 
and invalid status of the surrogate motherhood agreement would have on 
the child to be born from the surrogate motherhood agreement.67 The child 
would be deprived of the family life and environment planned for him/her 
and would furthermore be forced to rely for parental care upon the surrogate 
mother, who expressly stated her decision not to fulfil this future role.68 In 
its closing remarks the court warned against the use of this judgement as a 
way of circumventing the judicial procedure and instructed all future parties 
in surrogate motherhood agreements to adhere to all the requirements 
provided in chapter 19.69 
The High Court in Ex parte MS provided some guidelines for future 
confirmation of post-fertilisation surrogate motherhood agreement 
applications.70 It maintained that parties should still be required to draft and 
sign a written surrogate motherhood agreement and to present it to the High 
Court for confirmation, and that post-fertilisation applications be regarded 
as an exception to the rule.71 
Parties in exceptional circumstances will furthermore have to provide the 
court with sufficient reasons (facts) for their tardiness.72 Because parental 
responsibilities and rights are vested in the parents once the child is born, 
the parties will have to ensure that the surrogate motherhood agreement is 
confirmed by the court prior to the birth of the child.73 Once the child is born, 
the parties will have to rely upon alternative legal measures, inter alia 
adoption, a parental responsibilities and rights agreement as provided for 
                                            
66  Ex parte MS para 53. It should be noted that while chapter 19 does refer to the best 
interests of the child, it does not use the term "rights" in s 295(e). This section clearly 
provides that the "interests" of the child are to be taken into consideration. 
67  Ex parte MS para 54. 
68  Ex parte MS para 54. It is submitted that this might still be the case due to the fact 
that the donor eggs of the surrogate mother were used in the matter before the court, 
which affords her the right to terminate the surrogacy agreement in accordance with 
s 298(2) of chapter 19. It should be noted that the surrogate also retains the right to 
terminate the pregnancy in accordance with s 300 of chapter 19 and the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
69  Ex parte MS paras 57-58. 
70  Ex parte MS para 59-71. 
71  Ex parte MS para 61. 
72  Ex parte MS para 62. 
73  Ex parte MS para 67. 
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by section 22 of the Children's Act, or an application for guardianship under 
section 24 of the Children's Act.74 
Being satisfied that the parties in Ex parte MS had explained their failure to 
follow the protocol provided in chapter 19, and furthermore considering the 
time and effort they had spent on compiling a fully motivated application 
while also adhering to the other requirements in sections 292 and 295, the 
High Court confirmed the surrogate motherhood agreement.75 
In Ex parte MS, the court's interpretation and application of chapter 19 and 
other provisions contained in the Constitution raises concern.76 
2.4 Critique 
Surrogate motherhood agreements require meticulous regulation in order to 
protect the rights and interest of all the parties involved. In an attempt to 
regulate the interconnected relationships, chapter 19 prohibits the artificial 
fertilisation of a surrogate prior to the vetting and confirmation of a legally 
drafted surrogate motherhood agreement by the High Court.77 
The commissioning parents' inability to adhere to the requirements in 
chapter 19 should be analysed within the aforementioned framework. It 
should accordingly be noted that the commissioning parents had already 
entered into two prior surrogate motherhood agreements and were 
therefore familiar with the protocol.78 With regard to the court's application 
of section 39(2) of the Constitution, it could contextually be argued that the 
commissioning parents were aware of the importance of confirming a 
surrogate motherhood agreement. Furthermore, their deviation from the 
protocol was of their own volition and due to personal interest. This lack of 
adherence was therefore not in the interest of justice but rather due to 
personal preference and financial implications. 
The commissioning parents' behaviour de-emphasises the imperative 
purpose of the surrogate motherhood agreement. It furthermore 
undermines the complex inter-relational nature of such agreements by 
merely taking their own rights and interests into consideration. 
                                            
74  Ex parte MS para 69. 
75  Ex parte MS para 72-77. 
76  Louw 2014 De Jure 116-118. 
77  Sections 296(1)(a) and 303(1) of chapter 19. Also see Ex parte MS para 8. 
78  Ex parte MS para 13. 
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The court's three-pronged argument in Ex parte MS displays logical 
inconsistencies. While the court makes reference to certain provisions in 
chapter 19 it seems to interpret some of the provisions individually and not 
within the context of the entire chapter. This form of interpretation raises 
concern, given that misinterpretation often occurs when legislation is 
analysed in a vacuum. 
It is argued that a different conclusion could be reached when section 
292(1)(e) is read together with the prohibitions in sections 296 and 303 as 
well as the provision in section 297(2). While sections 292 and 295 may not 
have required that the surrogate mother not be artificially inseminated prior 
to the confirmation of the agreement, sections 296 and 303 clearly prohibit 
such an act. Section 297(2) accordingly makes provision for the parties' 
non-compliance. Though this non-compliance affects the legal status of the 
child, the affect is not permanent and can be altered once the child is born. 
Commissioning parents could accordingly pursue alternative legal 
measures such as a section 22 Parental Responsibilities and Rights order 
and a section 28 Termination, Extension, Suspension or Restriction of 
Parental Responsibilities and Rights order. They could also change the 
status of the child by means of adoption, as provided for in chapter 15 of the 
Children's Act.79 
The court's decision in Ex parte MS has furthermore set a dangerous 
precedent with regard to the discretion of the courts in surrogacy matters. 
This precedent was recently applied in Ex parte: HPP; Ex parte: DME 2017 
JOL 37415 (GP) (Ex parte HPP). The High Court in Ex parte HPP acted 
discretionally when it confirmed a surrogate motherhood agreement which 
had resulted from an unlawful facilitation agreement.80 Questionable 
wording was furthermore used by the court in Ex parte HPP, where the court 
made reference to the "rights of the unborn".81 
Reference to the rights of a non-legal subject can in part be attributed to the 
court's interpretation and application of the principle of the best interests of 
the child in Ex parte MS. Keightley J maintained the following with regard to 
the best interests of that child: 
In essence, surrogacy agreements are all about the child to be born. 
Accordingly, although the hoped-for child is not a party to the surrogacy 
                                            
79  These alternative legal measures will be further discussed in part 3 of this 
contribution. 
80  Ex parte: HPP; Ex parte: DME 2017 JOL 37415 (GP) (hereafter Ex parte HPP) para 
71. 
81  Ex parte HPP para 61. 
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motherhood agreement, his or her future rights and interests are the most 
important of all the rights and interests involved. To ensure that they are 
adequately protected, the law requires certainty and judicial scrutiny of the 
proposed surrogacy arrangement before there is even any prospect of a child 
coming into being.82 
The legislator's and adjudicator's inability to expressly establish whether the 
principle of the best interests of the child should be applied as a substantive 
(constitutional) right in surrogacy matters, raises concern. The position held 
by the legislator of chapter 19 (with specific reference to sections 295(b)(ii)) 
and the High Court in Ex parte MS suggests a consensus with the position 
held inter alia by the Vatican, that life begins at conception, owing to the use 
by both entities of the principle of the best interests of the child prior to its 
birth.83 
The court's use of the principle of the best interests of the child as a means 
to justifying its ruling has received criticism by Louw, who raises the 
important question, "When would it not be in the best interest of a child to 
confirm a surrogacy agreement once the child has been conceived?"84 
Louw accordingly asserts that the court must follow the necessary protocol 
to invalidate provisions that it deems to be in conflict with the Constitution.85 
Following this statement she recommends that the solution would not be to 
"introduce a loop-hole" that "makes a mockery" of the provisions contained 
in chapter 19.86 
In her recommendations Louw avers that the use of the principle of the best 
interests of the child as a supernatural problem solver (deus ex machina) 
merely confirms allegations of its manipulative nature.87 She refers to S v M 
(Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) (hereinafter 
S v M) and argues that, while the principle of the best interests of the child 
may be paramount in all matters concerning the child, it is not decisive, 
                                            
82  Ex parte MS para 9. 
83  Ratzinger and Bovone 1987 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ 
cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html. 
"From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in 
an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has 'wished for 
himself' and the spiritual soul of each man is 'immediately created' by God; his whole 
being bears the image of the Creator. Human life is sacred because from its 
beginning it involves 'the creative action of God' and it remains forever in a special 
relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from 
its beginning until its end: no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right 
to destroy directly an innocent human being." 
84  Louw 2014 De Jure 116. 
85  Louw 2014 De Jure 116. 
86  Louw 2014 De Jure 116. 
87  Louw 2014 De Jure 117. 
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because other factors should also be taken into consideration.88 In closing, 
Louw criticises the arguments used by the court and further maintains that 
the court's decision undermines the value of the legislation and creates 
doubt in the fragile surrogacy process.89 
All international, regional and national legal instruments define a child as 
any person born alive who is under a certain age, normally 18 years. In 
General Comment 14 on the United Nations Convention of the Rights of 
Children (1989) "Position on the best interest of the child", no reference is 
made to the rights of the unborn.90 This gives rise to the question of whether 
or not the best interest of the child is applicable in matters where the child 
has yet to be born alive. 
3 A way forward 
3.1 Limiting the best interest of the child  
Even if the best interests of the child were to be used as a constitutional 
right it is not absolute right and can be limited in accordance with section 36 
of the Constitution and section 6(2)(a) of the Children's Act.91 
In De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local 
Division) 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) (De Reuck) the court maintained that the use 
in section 28(2) of the word "paramount" does not omit the possible 
limitation of the best interest of the child by other rights.92 The approach 
adopted by the court in this case reiterated the view of constitutional rights 
as mutually "interdependent and interlinked", which allows them to form a 
singular constitutional value system.93 The court further emphasised the 
possibility of limiting section 28(2) in situations where such limitations would 
be "reasonable and justifiable" in accordance with the provisions of section 
                                            
88  Louw 2014 De Jure 118. 
89  Louw 2014 De Jure 118. 
90  CRC 2013 http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_ 
C_GC_14_ENG.pdf 7. 
91  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 280. S 36 of the Constitution 
provides the following: "(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including- (a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the 
limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) 
or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in 
the Bill of Rights." 
92  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 282. 
93  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 282. 
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36 of the Constitution.94 In reaching this decision the court maintained that 
even though the best interests of the child should be a paramount 
consideration in all matters pertaining to the child, this does not afford it the 
additional right to override other constitutional rights.95 
The court's interpretation of the best interests of the child in De Reuck 
caused some uncertainty regarding the precise meaning of the term 
"paramount importance".96 This uncertainty was deliberated further in S v 
M. In this case a single mother who had three children was found guilty of 
fraud and sentenced to prison. An appeal was brought before the court due 
to the fact that she was the primary caregiver. The court was urged to 
consider the effect that the possible imprisonment might have on the 
children.97 During its decision-making process the court was tasked with 
weighing up the best interests of the children with the community's right to 
receive protection from the effects of criminal acts.98 Attempting to derive 
meaning from the term "paramount importance" Sachs J commented on the 
expansive nature of the principle of paramountcy.99 He indicated that while 
the principle seemed to promise everything, it didn't really deliver 
particularly much.100 He drew attention to the indeterminate state of the 
concept of the best interest and the opportunity that this indeterminate state 
created for judges and legal professionals to understand the concept 
differently.101 
The court in S v M further emphasised the need to determine each matter 
on a case by case basis and in doing so to ensure a genuine "child-centred 
approach".102 This approach can be executed effectively only when the 
court determines the exact needs of the child in the particular case. A pre-
determined formula would therefore not necessarily meet this standard in 
every case. Sachs J concluded that while the principle is not an 
"overbearing and unrealistic trump", the paramount nature of the best 
interests of the child does not render those interests absolute.103 
                                            
94  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 282. 
95  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 282. 
96  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 282. 
97  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 283. 
98  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 283. 
99  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 283. 
100  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 283. 
101  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 283. 
102  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 283. 
103  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 3 SA 232 (CC) (hereafter S v 
M) para 26. 
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With regard to the matter of paramountcy, the court in S v M furthermore 
held that when reading the principle together with the right to family care 
one ought to duly consider the best interests of the children before the court 
and how these interests may be affected.104 According to the court this does 
not necessarily mean that all the other considerations should be overridden 
but rather necessitates a proper weighing of the considerations in each 
case.105 Having weighed up these respective considerations, the court 
should then attribute the most weight to the consideration to which the "law 
attaches the highest value", which is the best interests of the children in the 
matter.106 
A further insight pertaining to the possible limitation of the best interests of 
the child was added by Cameron J in Centre for Child Law v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development (National institution for Crime 
Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders as Amicus Curiae) 2009 2 SACR 
477 (CC). This case dealt with the matter of sentencing children to 
imprisonment.107 Cameron J held that the term "paramountcy" meant that 
while a child's interests are "more important than anything else" this did not 
render everything else unimportant.108 
In all the above-mentioned cases the children whose best interests were 
limited were already born alive and were bearers of subjective rights when 
the matters were placed before the court. However, surrogacy matters can 
be regarded as essentially different in that there not only is no guarantee 
that the child will be born alive, but furthermore, the surrogate mother still 
reserves the right to terminate either the pregnancy before the child is born 
or the surrogate motherhood agreement after the child has been born.109 
                                            
104  S v M para 25. 
105  S v M para 25. 
106  S v M para 25. 
107  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (National 
Institution for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 2 SACR 477 (CC). It is needless to say that this degree of sentencing should 
be implemented as "a measure of last resort" only. 
108  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (National 
Institution for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders as Amicus Curiae) 
2009 2 SACR 477 (CC) para 29. 
109  Section 298 of chapter 19 makes provision for the termination of the surrogacy 
agreement by the surrogate in matters where she is also the genetic parent of the 
child. This occurs in instances where the surrogate mother also acted as the egg 
donor during the surrogacy process. This termination may take place within sixty 
days after the birth of the child. The surrogate mother will have to file a notice with 
the respective court. A court may terminate the agreement in terms of s 295 of 
chapter 19 only once it is satisfied that all parties have been notified of the surrogate 
mother's intentions and after the court hearing. The court should furthermore be 
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The fact that the resultant child in surrogacy matters has yet to be born leads 
to the consideration of whether the limitation of the best interests of the 
unborn child would accord with section 36 of the Constitution. Given the 
facts in Ex parte MS it seems as though such a limitation would be justifiable 
and reasonable, as it would prevent future legal uncertainty regarding the 
legal status of the unborn and his/her ability to bear constitutionally 
entrenched rights, and in particular the right of the best interests of the child 
as provided in section 28(2) of the Constitution. This right would furthermore 
be limited only until the child is born alive. 
Courts could, however, still justify their use of the principle of the best 
interest of the child in surrogate motherhood agreements where parties 
adhered to all the requirements, by applying it as a rule of procedure or a 
fundamental interpretative legal principle but not a constitutionally 
entrenched right.110 The former approach would allow courts to follow a 
judiciary procedure in which they can assess the positive and negative 
outcomes of their decision and choose the one less likely to affect the 
resultant child negatively.111 The latter, in turn, would afford courts the ability 
to interpret legislation in a manner that would be most beneficial to the 
resultant child. In order for this to occur a clear separation ought to be made 
between the three concepts provided by general comment 14. 
It is submitted that, for the sake of legal certainty and consistency, courts 
should refrain from using the best interests of the child in matters where the 
commissioning parties did not adhere to the requirements prescribed in 
chapter 19. The court in Ex parte MS correctly identified a section 22 
                                            
satisfied that the surrogate mother terminated the agreement voluntarily and that she 
understands the legal and social implications of her decision. Having considered the 
best interests of the child the court may then make a valid order. It is important to 
note that the surrogate mother will not incur any liability to the commissioning parents 
if she decides to terminate the pregnancy in terms of this provision. This provision is 
made with regard to those payments made by the commissioning parents that are 
not listed in s 301 of chapter 19. S 301 prohibits all forms of compensation but 
provides the commissioning parents with the right to reclaim the payments made 
with respect to expenses that are directly related to the medical procedures, the 
surrogate mother's loss of earnings and insurance costs. S 300 of chapter 19 
provides the surrogate with the right to terminate the pregnancy in terms of the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. The surrogate mother is 
obliged, however, to inform the commissioning parents of her decision before 
terminating her pregnancy and to consult them before the procedure is carried out. 
The surrogate will have no liabilities towards the commissioning parents, save those 
expenses provided for in s 301 of chapter 19. 
110  CRC 2013 http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_ 
C_GC_14_ENG.pdf 4. 
111  CRC 2013 http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/crc/docs/GC/CRC_C_ 
GC_14_ENG.pdf 4. 
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parental responsibilities and rights agreement as a possible alternative in 
matters where parties have not met the requirements provided in chapter 
19. A section 22 agreement may be insufficient, however, as it does not 
terminate the responsibilities and rights of the surrogate mother or change 
the status of the child. Commissioning parents who may want to terminate 
the parental responsibilities and rights of the surrogate mother would be 
able to do so in accordance with section 28 of the Children's Act.112 Should 
the parties want to legally alter the status of the child born from a surrogate 
motherhood agreement, they would be able to do so by means of adoption, 
in accordance with chapter 15 of the Children's Act. 
To elaborate on these alternative approaches, the current status of 
surrogacy in the United Kingdom will briefly be considered. 
3.2 Surrogacy in the UK113 
Two pieces of legislation govern surrogacy in the UK.114 This article 
focusses on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008 (HFE Act) 
as the basis for the following discussion in relation to its provision for a 
Parental Order.115 
A Parental Order has been defined as a "fast-track adoption order" as it 
allows the commissioning parents to obtain parental responsibilities and 
rights after the child resulting from the surrogate motherhood agreement 
has been born.116 The process is initiated by a formal application made to 
the court that must be vetted and approved by a judge once s/he is satisfied 
that all the criteria have been met.117 The surrogate mother and her partner 
                                            
112  The commissioning parents would be able to make use of a section 28 application 
in their capacity as individuals who have an interest in the care, well-being and 
development of the child as provided for by subsection 1(b) of s 22 and s 28 of the 
Children's Act. 
113  The UK enacted legislation governing surrogacy matters in 1985. Legislation which 
makes provision for a parental order was enacted in 2008. 
114  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 11. Also see Brunet et al 2012 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20
K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_r
egime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 38. For purposes of this discussion the term "the UK" 
will refer to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
115  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 11. Provision for the parental order is provided for in 
ss 54 and 55 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008 (hereafter the 
HFE Act). 
116  Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_ 
REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20
surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 58. 
117  Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_ 
REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20
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are regarded as the legal parents of the child after the child is born and prior 
to the approval of the Parental Order.118 Both the surrogate mother and her 
partner are required to provide their consent in order for the Parental Oder 
to be approved.119 The Parental Order is approved only once the 
commissioning parents (the applicants) have sufficiently met all the 
requirements provided in section 54 of the HFE Act.120 
3.2.1 Requirements in section 54 of the HFE Act 
Both applicants must be 18 years or older and at least one of the two parties 
has to be domiciled in the UK at the time that the application is made.121 
Section 54 makes provision for applicants who are married, in a permanent 
living situation or in a civil partnership, but prohibits singles from making use 
of this process.122 
Section 54(1)(a) further requires that the surrogate be artificially 
inseminated and that there be a genetic link between the applicants and the 
embryo.123 The surrogate mother is regarded as the legal parent of the child 
                                            
surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 58. The 
criteria will briefly be discussed below. 
118  Section 33(1) of the HFE Act provides that: "The woman who is carrying or has 
carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, 
and no other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the child." The common law 
rule may also apply depending on the nature of the surrogacy agreement. Brunet et 
al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki 
%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative
_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 58. 
119  Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_ 
Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comp
arative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 58. 
120  Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_ 
Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comp
arative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 60-62. 
121  Section 54(5) of the HFE Act makes provision for the age requirement. It should be 
noted that no provision is made for an elderly age limit, while s 54(4)(b) makes 
provision for the domicile requirement. 
122  Section 54(1) of the HFE Act makes provision for the requirement of "two people". 
Also see Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_ 
REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20
surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 60. S 54(2) 
makes provision for the types of relationships. Note that the section specifically 
provides for two people who are living in an "enduring family relationship". 
123  Section 54(1)(a) of the HFE Act makes provision for artificial insemination by placing 
an embryo in the surrogate or sperm and egg cells, while s 54(1)(b) provides the 
genetic link requirement. Should the surrogate conceive though intercourse, the 
common law rules regarding legal parenthood will be applied. Brunet et al 2012 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20
K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_r
egime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 60. With regard to the genetic link requirement it should 
be noted that there is no requirement in the HFE Act that the intended mother be 
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regardless of whether or not she has a genetic link with the child.124 An 
application for a Parental Order has to be conducted within six months after 
the child's birth and the child should be residing with the applicants when 
the application is made.125 As with any other adoption matter, consent is 
required from the surrogate mother as well as her partner, where 
applicable.126 This requirement may be waived in the event that these 
individuals cannot be located or are incapable of providing their consent.127 
The court must furthermore be satisfied that there were no forms of 
commercial surrogacy in the presented application.128 The paramountcy of 
the child's welfare is not mentioned in the HFE Act but provision for it is 
made in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Order) 
Regulations, 2010. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the HFE Act, some difficulties with it have 
been identified.129 It is therefore necessary to duly consider these problems 
in order to establish whether or not an application akin to a parental order 
could serve as an acceptable alternative. 
3.2.2 Problems with the current requirements 
The first challenge pertains to the court's retrospective authorisation of 
payments in accordance with section 54(8) of the HFE Act.130 According to 
this provision the court has to be satisfied that the surrogate has received 
                                            
medically unable to carry a child to term and give birth to such a child, although a 
medical professional may require proof of this prior to commencing with a medical 
fertility treatment. Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_ 
REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20
surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 60. 
124  This is due to the provisions made in s 33 of the HFE Act, which are that the woman 
carrying (who has carried) the child be regarded as the mother of the child to whom 
she gave birth. 
125  Section 54(3) of the HFE Act makes provision for the time frame in which the 
application should be conducted while s 54(4)(a) requires that the child reside with 
the applicants at the time of the application and the making of the order. This means 
that the child will stay with individuals who are not his/her legal parents, or differently 
put, individuals who do not have a legal relationship with him/her. 
126  In accordance with s 54(6) of the HFE Act the court should be satisfied that this 
consent was given freely and with the parties' full understanding of the legal and 
social consequences of their decision. 
127  In accordance with s 54(7) of the HFE Act. 
128  Section 54(8) of the HFE Act does make provision for "expenses reasonably 
incurred". 
129  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 30-34. 
130  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 30. Also see Brunet et al 2012 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_Davaki%2C%20
K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comparative_study_r
egime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 62.  
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no monetary benefit other than for reasonably incurred expenses.131 This 
consideration by the court takes place only ex post facto and at this point 
the surrogate may not only have willingly received but also have spent the 
compensation given to her by the applicants.132 To date there has been no 
case in the UK where the court has refused an order based on the 
unreasonableness of the amount provided by the applicants to cover 
expenses.133 Courts have, however, indicated discomfort with this provision 
as it places them in a position where they may be obliged to refuse an 
expense order where such a refusal might be to the child's detriment.134 
The second problem concerns the time limit provided to the applicants in 
section 54(3). In X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) 2014 EWHC 3135 the 
court held that the parties could apply for a Parental Order even after the 
six-month time-frame provided by section 54. The court reached this 
decision having considered the long-term detrimental effect that the non-
obtainment of a Parental Order may have on the applicants as well as on 
the child in question.135 
The third problem relates to the single-parent requirement as provided for 
by section 54.136 In Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: 
Parental Order) 2015 EWFC 73 the presiding officer refused to grant a 
single male his Parental Order and based his decision for doing so solely 
on the words contained in section 54.137 According to the presiding officer, 
this section requires that an application be made by "two people" and 
therefore does not make provision for single-parent applications.138 
                                            
131  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 30. 
132  Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_ 
Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comp
arative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 62. 
133  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 30. In their report the authors refer to Re X and Y 
(Foreign Surrogacy) 2008 EWHC 3030 to indicate that this is the case even in 
matters where the applicants gave the surrogate 25,000 Euros in addition to their 
per month payment of 235 Euros. It later became known that the 25,000 Euros 
served as a deposit for the surrogate's flat, which clearly exceeds the requirement 
of "reasonable expenses" in s 54(8) of the HFE Act. 
134  Brunet et al 2012 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51063/1/__libfile_REPOSITORY_Content_ 
Davaki%2C%20K_Comparative%20study%20regime%20surrogacy_Davaki_Comp
arative_study_regime_surrogacy_2013.pdf 62. 
135  X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) 2014 EWHC 3135 para 55. A similar position 
was held by the court in A & B (No 2 - Parental Order) 2015 EWHC 2080. Also see 
Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 31. 
136  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 32. 
137  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 32. 
138  Re Z (A Child: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Parental Order) 2015 EWFC 
73 para 5. Also see Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 33. The applicant implored the 
court to interpret the legislation more flexibly, to no avail. The applicant further held 
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The fourth problem applies to the requirement for a genetic link between the 
applicant and the embryo.139 This issue transcends borders, as a similar 
case was brought before a South African court in 2015 in AB v Minister of 
Social Development as Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law 2015 4 All SA 
24 (GP). The matter of a genetic link is still heavily contested, with scholars 
on both sides advocating their position.140 
The final problem pertains to a lack of consent on the part of the 
surrogate.141 Section 54(6) of the HFE Act requires the surrogate mother to 
consent to the Parental Order while subsection (7) provides that this need 
not be the case where the surrogate cannot be located.142 Courts have, 
however, recently decided to dispense with this requirement because of the 
unavailability of the surrogate and in accordance with the need to promote 
the welfare of the child.143 
The Parental Order process as used in the UK provides an example of how 
South African commissioning parents could utilise the provisions in section 
22 and section 28 of the Children's Act in inadequate surrogacy matters. 
Even though the parties may have to wait until the child is born, they would 
still be responsible for the daily care and well-being of the child once the 
child is born, as the child would reside with them during the application 
process. This approach would not only create a suitable alternative for 
parties who do not meet the requirements provided in chapter 19, but it 
would also deter future applicants from circumventing the requirements in 
chapter 19. By referring the parties to inadequate surrogate agreements to 
section 22 and section 28, courts would furthermore be acting in the best 
interests of the child on a case by case basis, while not rendering moot the 
relevant provision in chapter 19. This option would provide more legal 
certainty regarding the principle of the best interests of the child and how it 
ought to be applied in inadequate surrogacy agreements where the unborn 
is not a bearer of subjective constitutional rights. 
                                            
that this provision was contrary to the right to a private family life as provided for 
under the Human Rights Act, 1998. This averment was made in the light of the fact 
that single women and men are allowed to become legal parents by means of 
adoption, conception by a donor, and in vitro fertilisation. 
139  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 33. 
140  AB v Minister of Social Development as Amicus Curiae: Centre for Child Law 2015 
4 All SA 24 (GP) para 100. 
141  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 34. 
142  Sections 54(6) and 54(7) of the HFE Act. Also see Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 
34. 
143  Smit et al Surrogacy in the UK 34. Reference is also made to D and L (Surrogacy) 
2012 EWHC 2631.  
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It is noted that some objections to this recommendation may arise, as one 
of the primary reasons why commissioning parents choose to make use of 
surrogate motherhood agreements, is that adoption does not necessarily 
cater to their specific needs.144 It is submitted, however, that the Parental 
Order application is similar to adoption only in terms of protocol/process. 
Stated differently, due to the requirement for a genetic link, the child who 
will be "adopted" would still genetically be the child of either one or both of 
the commissioning parents. This process is furthermore substantially 
different from the traditional adoption process with regard to the waiting 
period and the certainty of receiving a child. 
Provision can, however, be made for parties who adhere to all the 
requirements contained in chapter 19. If these requirements are not met the 
initial result (the validation of a surrogate motherhood agreement) cannot 
follow, as this would lead to a logical contradiction. Ignorance is not a 
defence and parties who do not meet the requirements set out in chapter 
19 should not be rewarded for their lack of compliance. 
4 Conclusion 
The support given to applicants who make use of surrogacy should be 
provided in a clear and transparent manner. Concern arises when ambiguity 
causes confusion regarding the interpretation and application of the 
principle of the best interests of the child in inadequate surrogacy matters. 
Having considered the legislation contained in chapter 19, the role of the 
court in interpreting and applying the legislation, and the responsibility of all 
the parties involved in the surrogate motherhood agreement, it is clear that 
urgent reconsideration is necessary. 
It is accordingly submitted that commissioning parents are under a legal 
obligation to adhere to all the requirements provided in chapter 19. In the 
event where the commission parents fully adhere to these requirements, it 
is fitting that the best interests of the unborn be considered and protected. 
Courts would be able to ensure that this occurs by interpreting general 
comment 14 in a limited manner and applying the best interests of the child 
principle as an interpretative tool and a guiding principle. Should legal 
reform regarding surrogacy insist on the rights of the unborn, the necessary 
legal steps should be taken to amend all applicable legislation. 
                                            
144  Louw 2013 THRHR 571. 
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Where the commissioning parents refrain from adhering to the 
requirements, it is submitted that the surrogate motherhood agreement not 
be confirmed. Parties should rather make use of alternative legal means 
once the child is born alive, in terms of the Digesta Texts. Such alternatives 
include a parental order as provided in section 22, a termination order 
(section 28), or adoption in terms of chapter 15 of the Children's Act. 
While the court in Ex parte MS can be commended for its identification of a 
potential lacuna with regard to surrogacy matters as well as its positive 
interpretation of the legislation, it is also clear that a dangerous precedent 
has been set. This paper presents an alternative to the impending legal and 
moral consequences that may follow if non-legal subjects should be 
afforded constitutional rights. 
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